Day 5 Operation Market Garden

Day 5: Thursday, 21 September

Oosterbeek

Approximately 3,584 survivors of the 1st Airborne Division established themselves in the buildings and woods around Oosterbeek with the intention of holding a bridgehead on the north side of the Rhine until XXX Corps could arrive. Throughout the day their position was heavily attacked on all sides. In the southeast the Lonsdale Force (the remnants of the 1st, 3rd, and 11th Parachute Battalions and 2nd South Staffordshires) repulsed a major attack aided by the fire of the divisional light artillery.

In the north the 7th King's Own Scottish Borderers were almost overrun during the afternoon, but a counterattack with bayonets restored the situation and the heavily depleted battalion moved further south to occupy a narrower front. The most serious attack of the day was made at dawn against "B" Company, 1st Battalion, Border Regiment, which controlled a vital area of high ground in the southwestern tip of the perimeter overlooking the Heveadorp ferry crossing at Driel, which was the division's only straightforward means of receiving reinforcements from the south. The company was attacked by enemy armour and infantry, and the heights were lost. Counterattacks failed and the remnants of the company were redeployed. The division was left in a precarious position, controlling just 700 meters (700 yards) of the riverbank. The division refused to yield ground to similar attacks elsewhere on their front.

A resupply attempt by RAF Stirlings of 38 Group was disrupted by the only effective Luftwaffe fighter interception during the entire operation. Fw 190s intercepted the Stirlings at low altitude and shot down 7 of one line of 10, and 15 overall. Anti-aircraft fire accounted for 8 further losses. The Fw 190s were able to penetrate the screen of Allied fighters sent to cover the drop when one group, the U.S. 56th Fighter Group, was late in arriving in its patrol sector between Lochem and Deventer. The 56th, however, did redeem itself to an extent by shooting down 15 of the 22 Fw 190s as they departed the area.

Polish Paratroopers Enter The Battle

After two days of weather-related delay, the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade under General Stanislaw Sosabowski finally entered the battle on the afternoon of September 21, delivered at about 17:15 by 114 C-47s of the U.S. 61st and 314th Troop Carrier Groups. Two of the brigade's three battalions were dropped amidst heavy German fire, opposite the 1st Airborne Division's position on a new drop zone south of the Rhine near the village of Driel. Poor coordination by the RAF and persistent attacks by Luftwaffe aircraft caused their supplies to be dropped 15 km (9 miles) away, on the opposite side of the Rhine.

Planning to use the Heveadorp ferry to reinforce the division, they soon discovered that the opposite bank was dominated by the enemy and that the ferry was missing; it was later found downstream past the road bridge, unserviceable. Unable to help the British, the Polish withdrew to Driel for the night. The 1st Airborne Division made radio contact during the day with guns of the 64th Medium Regiment of XXX Corps Artillery which had advanced with the ground forces and were assigned to provide the division with artillery support. Unlike many others, this radio link endured throughout the battle and the regiment provided valuable fire support to the division.

Nijmegen
Despite the capture of Nijmegen bridge and the clearing of the town on the previous evening, the Guards Armoured Division did not begin to advance until some 18 hours later, at noon. Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks claimed he needed this delay to sort out the confusion among his troops that had resulted from the battle in Nijmegen. This was a controversial decision that has been examined often in the years since. Half of the division had been detached to assist the 82nd Airborne Division elsewhere as the Germans sought to cut off the tip of the advance. The remainder of the Guards Armoured Division was short of fuel and exhausted from its difficult fight to secure Nijmegen. The Market/Garden plan depended upon a single highway as the route of advance and resupply. This imposed a delay since other units could not be deployed on alternate routes to sustain the forward momentum. General Gavin's diary comment was: "Had Ridgway been in command at that moment, we would have been ordered up that road in spite of all our difficulties, to save the men at Arnhem." The historian Max Hastings wrote "It reflected poorly on the British Army...".

The delay enabled the Germans to considerably shore up their defences to the south of Arnhem, aided by use of the bridge following their capture of its northern end. The advance of the Guards, hindered by marshes that prevented off-road movement, was soon halted by a firm German defensive line. The Guards not having the strength to outflank it, the 43rd Division was ordered to take over the lead, work its way around the enemy positions and make contact with the Polish at Driel. However, the 43rd was 30 km (20 miles) away and there was a traffic jam between it and Nijmegen. It was not until the following day, Friday, that the whole division finally crossed the River Waal and began its advance.

The Germans, clearly starting to gain the upper hand, continued their counterattacks all along the path of XXX Corps, although the Corps still managed to advance and the 101st Airborne Division continued to exploit its gains.

At about 15:00, 406 C-47 glider tugs and 33 C-47 cargo carriers executed a resupply mission for the 82nd Airborne Division. About 60% of the supplies were recovered (351 of the gliders were counted effective), partly with the help of Dutch civilians. Most of the 82nd and 101st, reinforced with British armour units, were engaged in defensive missions with the objective of holding the highway corridor. Small attacks were fought all along the corridor.

Wijchen bridge
After the victory of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Wijchen the Germans tried to attack the Edithbridge from the north end. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment requested the 101st Airborne Division for help. Advancing directly, they couldn't get close enough to the Germans. It looked like another failure to secure the bridge. But the 101st then headed into Wijchen. Ultimately the Germans were not strong enough to defend their position and had to abandon the bridges in Wijchen to the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment.